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Questions around how to conserve nature are increasingly leading to dissonance in conservation 
planning and action. While science can assist in unraveling the nature of conservation 
challenges, conservation responses rely heavily on normative positions and constructs to order 
actions, aid interpretations, and provide motivation. However, problems can arise when norms 
are mistaken for science or when they stymy scientific rigor. To highlight these potential pitfalls, 
we utilized the ethics-based tool of argument analysis to assess a controversial conservation 
intervention, the Pelorus Island Goat Control Program. We found that the program proponents’ 
argument for restorative justice was unsound because it relied upon weak logical construction 
overly entrenched in normative assumptions. Overreliance on normative constructs, particularly 
the invocation of tragedy, creates a sense of urgency that can subvert scientific and ethical 
integrity, obscure values and assumptions, and increase the propensity for flawed logic. This 
example demonstrates how the same constructs that drive biodiversity conservation can also 
drive poor decision-making, spur public backlash, and justify poor animal welfare outcomes. To 
provide clarity, we present a decision making flowchart to demonstrate how values, norms, and 
ethics influence one another and recommend practitioners follow three key checkpoints to 
improve decision making: be aware of values, as well as the normative constructs and ethical 
theories that those values inform; be mindful of overreliance on either normative constructs or 
ethics when deciding action is justified; and be logically sound and transparent when building 
justifications. We also recommend five key attributes that practitioners should be attentive to 
when making conservation decisions: clarity, transparency, scientific integrity, adaptiveness, and 
compassion. Greater attention to the role of norms in decision-making will improve conservation 




Questions of how to engage with nature and rectify human global impacts continue to inundate 
the conservation community. Urgent action is needed in the face of unprecendented wildlife 
species extinction rates and population declines (Bellard et al. 2012; WWF 2016). The rapid and 
far-reaching changes taking place – driven by a multitude of processes and threats – continue to 
overwhelm policy makers, conservation practitioners, and the general public, leading to 
dissonance and confusion. Conservationists agree that action ought to be taken to conserve 
biodiversity, but how that should be achieved remains divisive.  
While empirical information (e.g., scientific evidence, observation) can assist in unraveling 
global environmental changes, it cannot advise on how conservationists ought to respond. 
Instead, conservation decision-makers, both those in policy and those responsible for designing 
and implementing science-based intervention, rely on social norms (i.e., societal values, 
expectations, and codes of conduct) to help garner a clear conservation mandate and develop 
ethical conservation practices (Chew & Laubichler 2003; Lapinski & Rimal 2005; Manfredo et 
al. 2017; Batavia et al. 2019). These social norms are often communicated using terms that are 
amenable to socially constructed interpretations (Proctor 1998), also known as normative 
constructs. The definition and declaration of normative constructs are open to interpretation and 
guided by the values of decision-makers and the cultural context (Chew & Laubichler 2003; 
Lapinski & Rimal 2005; Estevez et al. 2014). Generally speaking, normative constructs have 3 
components: a factual definition (e.g., pest: “a plant or animal detrimental to human concerns” 
[Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2019 ]); the socially constructed judgment of what fits that 
definition (e.g., Is this animal a pest? When? To whom?); and an implicit value statement or 
justification for action (e.g., pests ought to be removed) (Proctor 1998). Both social norms and 
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normative constructs serve as heuristics in decision-making processes, and are therefore 
fundamental to motivating practitioners and assisting in the prioritization of scarce resources 
(Lapinski & Rimal 2005). More importantly, in the conservation decision-making model we 
described in this study (Fig. 1), normative constructs are critical for interpreting available 
empirical information (i.e., normative interpretations) and initiating a call to action. Exactly how 
one ought to act, however, is informed by the ethical theories (e.g., deontology, 
consequentialism) held by the decision-makers themselves (Estevez et al. 2014). Combined, 
norms and ethics are important drivers of decision-making. The challenge is to be cognizant of 
the power of norms and ethical theories in the decision-making process. 
The last few years have witnessed increasing criticism of the lack of, or selective use of, 
scientific evidence and strong logic to support conservation policy (Treves 2009; Vucetich & 
Nelson 2012; Artelle et al. 2014; Bergstrom et al. 2014). Conservation programs that violate 
basic principles of logic or disregard scientific evidence are commonplace and often spur public, 
scientific, and political controversy. Recent topical examples include Canadian wildlife agencies 
manipulating scientific statements against grizzly bear (Ursus arctos horribilis) hunting to 
support new hunting seasons (Artelle et al. 2014) and government officials ignoring peer-
reviewed evidence that badger (Meles meles) culling is an ineffective method for long-term 
reduction of bovine tuberculosis (Jenkins et al. 2010). In such cases, evidence suggests that the 
normative constructs, hidden assumptions, and ideological beliefs that shape social and political 
agendas are overly influencing the decision-makers’ reasoning (Heeren et al. 2017) to the extent 
that fundamentals of logic are circumvented. 
We explored this worrying trend by examining how the overemphasis of the reason for acting 
(i.e., normative constructs) might be disrupting and delegitimizing decision-making processes. 
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By characterizing the relationships between values, norms, empirical evidence, and ethics in 
decision-making (as depicted in Fig. 1), we postulated that the overemphasis of norms may 
generate three primary concerns: that the acquisition of knowledge may not be pursued, either 
because it is deemed unnecessary or because the normative interpretations are misconstrued as 
empirical evidence; that clear interpretations of and adherence to ethical theories may become 
obfuscated; and that arguments for intervention may be increasingly susceptible to failures in 
logic (Chew & Laubichler 2003). Failure to acquire proper empirical evidence to support 
interventions can make program evaluation difficult and justifications difficult to convey (e.g., 
Walsh et al. 2012; Bergstrom et al. 2014). Irrespective of the support for the underlying 
normative positions, universal community and scientific support can be withdrawn if there is a 
perception of insufficient ethical consideration or transparency (Miller et al. 2011; Robinson 
2011; Ramp et al. 2013; Ban et al. 2013). More problematically, decision-makers may 
mistakenly rely on interpretation of social norms to retroactively justify interventions, rather than 
articulating logical arguments supported by strong evidence and being explicit about values and 
assumptions. 
To work through how these pitfalls manifest in contemporary conservation decision-making, we 
performed an ethics-based analysis of a recent topical example that attracted considerable 
international debate. While this example is not reflective of all conservation decisions that attract 
negative debate, we selected it because it clearly highlights a situation where there was a strong 
emphasis of normative constructs in the decision-making process. Our case study originated on 
Pelorus Island, Queensland, Australia, where a management plan conceived by the local council 
and conservation scientists was eventually abandoned after international outcry and state 
government intervention. We suggest that the methods proposed, and subsequently partially 
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taken, transgressed most rational and ethical considerations and had little support despite having 
goals that align with a mainstream conservation agenda, namely the removal of introduced 
species.  
To explore our case study, we employed the ethics-based tool of argument analysis, which 
evaluates the degree to which decision-making adheres to the rules of informal logic and 
adequate transparency (Hughes et al. 2010; Vucetich & Nelson 2012). This method breaks down 
an argument into its two basic components – premises and conclusions – and evaluates each 
premise for truth and examines the construction of the argument for valid logic (a detailed 
introduction to argument construction and argument analysis is available in Supporting 
Information). This process tests whether decisions are underpinned by arguments that are clear, 
consistent, and sound and sheds light on the way normative constructs intersect with values and 
ethical positions to shape those decisions (Vucetich & Nelson 2012). We applied argument 
analysis to the Pelorus Island narrative as a case study for describing the importance of moral 
attentiveness, for detailing strategies to earn the confidence of both scientists and lay 
stakeholders, and for analyzing the fundamental drivers of contentious conservation decision-
making. We used this process to inform a conservation decision-making toolkit, complete with a 
decision-making conceptual model, checkpoints, and recommendations, that we believe will help 
practitioners and policy makers construct robust and transparent conservation programs and 
prevent discord in future conservation planning.  
Pelorus Island Goat Control Program  
Pelorus Island lies off the coast of northern Queensland approximately 85 km north of 
Townsville. Dominated by littoral rainforest, the small island (~4 km2) belongs to a group of rare 
ecosystems with ≥70% closed canopy cover and within 2 km of the coast (DECC 2008, Schwartz 
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2016a). In July 2016, elected officials from the Hinchinbrook Shire council commenced the 
Pelorus Island Goat Control Program (PIGCP), designed to eradicate ~300 goats (Capra 
aegagrus hircus) from the island (Cripps 2016). The goats were introduced to the island over 200 
years ago as a food source for lighthouse keepers and shipwrecked sailors. Scientific evidence 
justifying the need to intervene is not publicly available, but the Hinchinbrook Shire council 
deemed removal of the goats was necessary because their presence was purportedly linked to 
undesirable ecological states that cause increased runoff and soil erosion (Schwartz 2016a).  
The intervention planned to trap four wild male dingoes (Canis dingo) on the Australian 
mainland, castrate and vaccinate them, attach GPS collars, and then introduce them to the island 
to predate on the goats (Schwartz 2016a; Cripps 2016). After two years, the dingoes would be 
lethally shot to prevent them from predating upon other fauna. As a precaution, however, each 
dingo would be implanted with lethal 1080 (sodium flouroacetate) poison capsules that would 
dissolve and kill them after two years if shooting proved too difficult (Schwartz 2016a; Cripps 
2016). This program was approved by the Queensland Animal Ethics committee and was 
partially funded by the Australian Academy of Science (Townsville Bulletin 2016; Australian 
Academy of Science 2017). The PIGCP was intended as a test case and, if successful, would be 
expanded to other islands inhabited by goats (Schwartz 2016a). The program commenced in July 
2016 with the release of two poison-laced dingoes.  
Publicity of the intervention on ABC Landline prompted swift condemnation from the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Likewise, the general public 
communicated opposition in social media posts and an online international petition that garnered 
nearly 200,000 signatures in protest. Positions denouncing the project cited unjustifiable 
consequences such as the welfare of the goats, the poisoning of the dingoes, and the potential 
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harm to small native animals (Schwartz 2016b; Goldman 2016; Miles 2016). Responding to the 
public backlash, the Queensland Minister of Environment intervened to halt the program with an 
Interim Conservation Order on the grounds that it endangered a threatened shore bird (Goldman 
2016; Schwartz 2016b; Miles 2016). 
Methods 
Using argument analysis, we identified the major arguments articulated by both proponents and 
objectors and evaluated key reasoning and justifications. We then selected a central argument 
articulated by proponents and examined the premises and conclusion that compose the argument. 
Finally, we assessed the argument for its dependency on scientific evidence and normative 
constructs to understand how the decision to intervene and the actions taken were justified. 
Stakeholder Reason Statements 
We reviewed available newspaper articles, television programs, social media posts, press 
releases, and communication plans published over the seven months following the public 
announcement of the PIGCP in July 2016. We identified key stakeholders and collated 
statements made by each as pertains to the PIGCP (Table 1). We classified statements according 
to support or disapproval for the PIGCP and extracted reasons from these statements, which were 
sorted into a reason table (Table 2). The reasons provided are inferred from public statements 
and the PIGCP itself and are therefore not exhaustive. We assumed that primary reasons for 
implementing the PIGCP were publically stated, but it is possible a fundamental reason was 
withheld. From this table, we selected what we inferred was a central reason for supporting the 
implementation of the PIGCP to examine further. 
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The underlying motivation of conservation programs, such as the PIGCP, is to enable nature to 
flourish by preventing or reversing outcomes that inhibit progress. This concept largely reflects 
the widely accepted moral obligation to restorative justice, or repairing harm or damage we have 
caused. We examined the use of restorative justice as an argument supporting the 
implementation of the PIGCP because it invokes a sense of tragedy to nature, which can elicit a 
range of conservation intervention recommendations depending on the ethical theories and 
values held by the decision-makers. To identify fundamental flaws in logic, we transformed a 
key inconclusive premise of the primary argument into the conclusion of a secondary argument, 
and a key inconclusive premise in the secondary argument into the conclusion of a tertiary 
argument. This created a nested set of arguments; the tertiary argument informed the truth or 
appropriateness of the premise in the secondary argument, which in turn informed the premise in 
the primary argument (Fig. 2). We added the implicit premises required to ensure logical strength 




The 3 premises were  anthropogenic activity (introducing goats that graze) has damaged 
the ecosystem of Pelorus Island (P1); we ought to appropriately respond to damage we 
have caused (P2); and implementing the PIGCP is an appropriate response to the damage 
we have caused (P3). The conclusion (C) was, we  ought to implement the PIGCP. 
Premise 1 demonstrates how a normative interpretation can be presented as empirical evidence 
rather than informed by it (Fig. 1). First, this normative interpretation would be more defensible 
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if grounded in scientific evidence, such as goat population estimates, vegetation indices, or 
erosion metrics. If scientific reports, findings, or analyses on the ecological state of Pelorus 
Island exist, they have not been released to the public or cited in Hinchinbrook Shire meeting 
minutes or biosecurity plan. A draft of the goat removal plan and communications strategy does 
not reference any science-based evidence of changing ecological states (Cripps 2016). Second, 
though this absence of evidence does not indicate evidence of absence, it does suggest that this 
statement overly relies on the unwavering belief in the tenets of the normative discipline of 
invasion biology (e.g., the mere presence of goats is evidence of harm). While the framework of 
invasion biology has become dominant in the last few decades, alternative scientific perspectives 
challenge its attempts to present empirical information as answers to questions that are based on 
(often anthropocentric) values and its tendencies to present values-based conclusions as 
empirical information (e.g., Chew & Laubichler 2003, Sagoff 2018). Ultimately the purpose of 
analyzing the premise here is not to argue about the ecological function of goats, but rather to 
demonstrate the lack of scientific transparency that can occur when ardent credence in a 
normative discipline downplays critical analysis of normative influence and consequently 
equivocates normative interpretations with fact. Because this statement takes the form of a 
normative interpretation specific to one discipline that is not unanimously supported, P1 is 
inconclusive. 
Premise 2 invokes the practice of restorative justice, or fixing what we have broken.  Because 
humans generally strive to act in ways that are virtuous, restorative justice,  is a generally agreed 
upon social norm that is also an integral component of virtuousness.   
The evaluation of P3, which suggests the appropriateness of intervening, relies on the truth of P1, 
which we declared as unsubstantiated. Only when the justification for intervention in P1 is 
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further investigated can one begin to explore whether the methods suggested in the PIGCP are 
scientifically robust and ethical. We were therefore able to analyze only the appropriateness of 
this premise under the assumption that P1 is true and could explore only the theoretical reasoning 
of the PIGCP method as a whole.   
Secondary Argument (2o) 
The appropriateness of P3 can be evaluated by converting it into the conclusion of a new 
argument. The construction of this argument is informed by a line of reasoning stated by the 
mayor of the Hinchinbrook Shire (Schwartz 2016a):   predation is natural (P1 2o) ; by 
introducing dingo predation, the PIGCP is natural (P2 2o) (Table 1); and   
SSG,  reference the table so as not to repeatmanagement interventions that are natural are 
appropriate responses to anthropogenic ecological damage (P3 2o). Conclusion (C1 2o): he 
PIGCP is an appropriate response to the damage we have caused. 
The ecological statement of P1(2o) is irrefutable, if only because it is tautological. Predation is a 
key component of food webs and energy transfer, trophic cascades, and life on Earth in general. 
Premise 2(2o) is adapted directly from the ABC Landline report (Schwartz 2016a), in which the 
mayor states that the PIGCP is nature. Such normative language evokes the age-old debate over 
the construct of nature. The operative definition of nature can shift considerably among various 
contexts of human intervention. British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1874) asserted that the 
frame of reference used to define nature is delineated by the perception of how humans relate to 
the rest of the natural world. Nature is therefore defined in two separate contexts: one includes 
human activity that puts forces of the natural world together and the other excludes human 
activity altogether. The definition of nature invoked by the user determines the degree to which 
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human intervention on Pelorus Island adheres to being natural. In this premise, however, nature 
is also employed in what Mill (1874:71) calls a false third definition: “some external criterion of 
what we should do,” which is most likely informed by a preference for either the first or second 
definition. The appeal to an ill-defined nature sets this argument up for a fallacy of equivocation, 
when an ambiguous word is used with two different meanings in an effort to meet a falsely 
derived criterion: introducing that which is nature in P2(2o) is inappropriately equivocated with 
nature from P1(2o). The premise  also exposes a fallacy of composition, a false assumption that a 
quality applies to a whole because it applies to a part of that whole. Regardless of which 
definition of natural is applied, the argument required to support the truth of this premise – an 
entire action is natural if one piece of it is natural – is logically flawed. 
Premise 3(2o)  not only calls on Mill’s (1874) third false definition of nature, but also attempts to 
justify an intervention method based on the degree of naturalness to which the program adheres. 
Management of ecosystems, however, always requires some degree of human intervention. If 
naturalness were a criterion of the appropriateness of an intervention, then even successful 
programs may not be considered appropriate. Although this particular premise would benefit 
from additional analysis in the context of the PIGCP, a tertiary argument is not necessary here 
because the evaluation of P2(2o)  already nullifies the argument. 
Tertiary Argument (3o) 
The fallacy of composition in P2(2o) clearly demonstrates weak logic, but the fundamental flaw 
is revealed when the premise is converted into the conclusion of the tertiary argument: 
Introducing dingo predation is natural (P1 3o). If part of a plan is natural, the entire plan is 
natural (P2 3o). Conclusion: By introducing dingo predation, the PIGCP is natural. 
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Premise 2(3o) identifies the source of the fallacy of composition by suggesting that if part of 
something is X (e.g., if part of a birthday cake is eggs), the whole thing must then be X (then the 
whole cake is eggs). More importantly, when another component of the PIGCP is substituted into 
an alternative argument structure (A3o), the subsequent conclusion contradicts the naturalness of 
the PIGCP: Embedding 1080 capsules into dingoes is not nature (P1b A3o). If part of a plan is 
not nature, the entire plan is not nature (P2b A3o). Conclusion: By embedding 1080 capsules into 
dingoes, the PIGCP is not nature (C1b A3o).  
The logical sequence of the tertiary argument supports the conclusion that the PIGCP is both 
nature and not nature. This, in turn, violates Aristotle’s law of noncontradiction, which states, “it 
is impossible to hold the same thing to be and not to be” (Gottlieb 2015). The tertiary argument 
is therefore not a sound argument.  
Argument Analysis Conclusions  
The premises and conclusions construct one large set of nested arguments (Fig. 2), and because 
the tertiary argument informing the secondary and primary arguments is not sound, we 
concluded that the argument as a whole is not sound. Arguments are only as strong as their 
weakest premise, and even if our conclusion for one or more premises is refuted, sufficient 
uncertainties are present to warrant the examined reason (we should repair harm or damage we 
have caused) as insufficient justification for the implementation of the PIGCP. 
Discussion 
The PIGCP is an example of conservation decision-making that falls afoul of three primary 
concerns that result from the overemphasis of normative constructs. Using argument analysis, we 
highlighted a misrepresentation of normative interpretations as fact in the absence of empirical 
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evidence and pinpointed the weak logical construction of the entire argument. We further suggest 
that overreliance on norms obfuscated appropriate interpretations of and adherence to ethical 
theories that are pivotal in helping to justify interventions. While much of the public debate 
centered on the manner of the proposed actions, implicit in that outcry and the consequent 
cancellation of the project are the three underlining problems that we highlight.  
In light of increasing debate on the merits of different conservation programs and actions, such 
as habitat restoration and climate change mitigation, we have attempted to highlight why it is that 
conservation arguments can sometimes be susceptible to these types of failures. While part of the 
answer may be because of a general lack of education in ethics among scientists and managers 
(Saltz et al. 2019), we have suggested here that a persuasive alternative answer lies in the 
overreliance on normative constructs (Callicott et al. 1999; Chew & Laubichler 2003). At the 
heart of conservation, practitioners develop policy to act in response to ecological scenarios that 
have unfolded contrary to normative definitions, expectations, or images of nature. This response 
mechanism is shaped by the desire to conserve in the face of perceived tragedy. Discussed at 
great lengths in the humanities, the concept of tragedy intrinsically shapes the way we perceive 
the world around us (Golden 1976), yet its role in conservation receives little attention. Adapting 
Aristotle’s definition of tragedy as a mimicry (i.e., dramatic performance) that elicits pity and 
fear from the audience (Golden 1976), we define tragedy in the context of conservation as an 
ecological narrative in which nature is  affected by humankind. 
Tragedy can manifest at an individual, species, population, or ecosystem level. Species 
extinction is perceived as a fundamental tragedy that conservationists strive to prevent, as are 
habitat loss, pollution, the impacts of climate change, and many other repercussions of 
anthropogenic change. With the goal of enabling nature to flourish, conservation seeks to 
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mitigate or reverse tragic outcomes that alter nature. Though normative language assists with 
communicating narratives through linguistic representation, the socially constructed  
interpretation of words like tragedy, nature, and pest can become overinflated when invoked in 
scientific discourse (Chew & Laubichler 2003). When utilized, empirical science can help 
unravel the nature of tragedies to provide factual context and allow for quantifiable objectives to 
be established. But normative constructs like tragedy are framed by values (Manfredo et al. 
2017), and together with ethical theories are used to inform effective and logical decisions 
required to meet those objectives (Fig. 1). The challenge is to be cognizant of the roles of norms 
and ethical theories in the decision-making process: disregard for strongly held normative 
positions or the overemphasis of only one specific ethical philosophy may override social 
acceptability, such as when the unwillingness of national governments to act on climate change 
provokes strong condemnation from the public. Meanwhile, overemphasizing normative 
constructs can risk clouding the adherence to moral ethical theories and as we have shown, can 
impede critical thought and transparency, and permit unsuccessful or unethical interventions. 
Inattention to the power of norms and ethics has been implicated in the immediate response to 
eliminate species whose ranges have expanded through human-assisted dispersal. Considered 
alien and invasive, the mere presence of goats out of range conflicts with normative expectations 
of nature for both conservationists and laypeople alike. The power of anecdotes and norms can 
supersede scientific evidence and entrench perceptions that the presence of goats is intrinsically 
wrong, requiring control or removal under the mandate of invasion biology (Sutherland et al. 
2004; Larson 2005). Inherent in this view is the tragedy of globalization: although migrants can 
become integral components of modern ecosystems individually or collectively (Carroll 2011; 
Schlaepfer 2011), their fate is nevertheless sealed by their tragic nomenclature (Simberloff 2012; 
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Chew 2015). In these cases, empirical information is not always presented as the foundation of a 
normative position, and instead the sense of tragedy triggered by the mere existence of wild 
goats out of range can incur further harms by inhibiting the adoption of morally attentive ethical 
theories, impeding logic, and incentivizing reliance on normative interpretations in place of 
evidence (Larson 2005).  
We suggest that a key reason for the numerous uncertainties of both truth and appropriateness 
imbedded in a key justification for the PIGCP lies in the tragedy invoked by the program 
proponents: introduced species do not represent nature (i.e., the nature they value). The drive to 
intervene, empowered by the normative constructs of tragedy, nature, and invasive, 
overshadowed a critical analysis of the values, norms, and ethics driving the program; 
outweighed the imperative to be transparent, both in science and values; and obscured the ability 
of program proponents and animal ethics and funding bodies to consider the consequences of 
their ethical theories, such as the welfare trade-offs of the dingoes, goats, and other resident 
species. Moreover, the provision of a scientific and logical justification that the goats have 
deleterious impacts would not be sufficient to mend the examined arguments because failures in 
truth and violations of Aristotelian logic are committed throughout. The role of goats as actors in 
this global conservation tragedy creates distance between ethical discourse and conservation 
action (Caughley & Sinclair 1994), whereby the power of tragedy subverts ethical engagement, 
scientific integrity, welfare considerations, strong logic to support decisions, and transparency of 
norms and assumptions. Seeking to address what the council perceived to be an ecological 
tragedy, they inadvertently created a plan that would exacerbate the tragedy on Pelorus Island.  
Our conceptual model of conservation decision-making (Fig. 1) clearly defines the interrelated 
inputs that direct the decision-making process. The model highlights that when normative 
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constructs are overly emphasized, normative interpretations can be misconstrued as empirical 
information and the use of science and logic in the decision-making process can become weak or 
omitted altogether. To combat these fundamental errors, we provide three checkpoints in the 
model that strategically pause the decision-making flow. First, decision-makers must be aware of 
values and their sources, as well as the normative constructs and ethical theories that those values 
inform. This checkpoint elucidates the motivations and priorities of the decision maker, and 
identifies those that may benefit from the decision-making process. Second, be mindful of 
overreliance on either normative constructs or ethics when deciding action is justified. Not only 
does this checkpoint recommend self-reflection by the decision-makers, it can also identify 
potential points of contention and therefore encourage stakeholder consideration and 
engagement. Third, be logically sound and transparent when building justifications. This last 
checkpoint ensures that decisions are thoroughly developed, are not grounded on inappropriate 
assumptions or poor reasoning, and are informed by relevant science. Implementation of this 
checkpoint requires better training in critical thinking in the conservation sciences. Equipping 
conservation decision-makers with tools such as argument analysis would improve recognition 
of values, norms, and ethical theories, improve moral attentiveness, and increase the 
effectiveness of conservation decision-making. 
As demonstrated by this PIGCP case study, the scientific discourse around conservation 
decision-making process is often misconstrued as independent of the ethical frameworks and 
social norms that inform conservation decisions. To lay the groundwork for integrating ethics 
into mainstream conservation, we recommend five fundamental attributes of improved 
conservation decision-making: clarity, transparency, scientific integrity, adaptiveness, and 
compassion. Clarity requires that decision makers are explicit; they should clearly identify norms 
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and values driving decision-making and use sound logic (Vucetich & Nelson 2012). 
Transparency ensures information, such as assumptions, motivations, scientific evidence, and 
methods (Dubois et al. 2017), is shared. Upholding scientific integrity is to inform decision-
making with scientific evidence, to ensure that normative interpretations are not misinterpreted; 
to establish clear benchmarks for success and thresholds for expected outcomes (Biggs & Rogers 
2003); to design methods that are appropriate for achieving, monitoring, and evaluating success; 
and to reassess the call to action following intervention (i.e., does the intervention need to 
continue?) (Dubois et al. 2017). Adaptiveness requires an open mind when engaging with 
stakeholders and their positions and the ability to manage wildlife in a way that appeals to a 
range of moral perspectives and values (van Eeden et al. 2017). Adopting the practice of 
stakeholder engagement informs a thorough evaluation of the values, outcomes, welfare, and 
trade-offs for a wide array of stakeholders and assures that benefits are maximized and harms are 
minimized. Lastly, having compassion means that decision makers will consider the 
consequences of conservation intervention on sentient individuals and evaluate whether harm is 
justified or is a product of overrelying on normative positions (Ramp et al. 2013). 
Our intention in analyzing the justification for the PIGCP was to demonstrate the importance of 
harmonizing normative constructs, ethics, and logical argument construction so that conservation 
decision makers can design better and more successful conservation programs. We hope the 
adoption of this toolkit will help clarify the role of normative constructs, diminish existing 
contentions in conservation decision-making, and improve the success of conservation objectives 
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An introduction to the basic structure of an argument and how to perform argument analysis 
(Appendix S1) is available online. The authors are solely responsible for the content and 
functionality of these materials. Queries (other than absence of the material) should be directed 
to the corresponding author. 
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Table 1. Stakeholder statements supporting and opposing the Pelorus Island Goat Control 
Program (PIGCP)a  aggregated from news reports, articles, press releases, and petition websites 
in the 7 months following the announcement of the PIGCP.  
hanging indent will be used as shown in first row; added footnote a is needed for context 
Stakeholder Statement or goalb 
Mayor, Hinchinbrook 
Shire 
"…we… thought, 'well that's perfect.' This is nature. …the dingo is 
a predator. The goat is a source of the dingo's affections. So, we 
believe …we'll just put nature together and that'll sort out a 
problem."* 
"Look at it: it's a beautiful, pristine environment. As a council, we 
have an obligation as the trustees of this land, as the custodians 
of this land to control and or eradicate pests."* 
"There is a greater good here and the greater good is that we have 
an island that is disappearing right in the middle of the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park."** 
Chief Pest Officer & 
Coordinator of PIGCP, 
Hinchinbrook Shire 
 
"The goats have literally taken out all the understorey species of 
vegetation and that has allowed all the soils to be exposed and to be 
washed away and to be trampled down the mountain by the goats. 
... It's all washing down, straight out to the reef."* 
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"We're gonna protect so many of these islands long term. Once this 
one's successful, it'll set the platform for many other island 
managers to follow through and to carry out similar projects."* 
Hinchinbrook Shire 
Council 
On 1080 tablets: "The council said it was a ‘failsafe’ to ensure the 
dingoes did not starve or become an entrenched pest on the island." 
† 
PIGCP Ecologist "And this whole island should look like a forest…and this is the 
reason why we're doing it so that if we can get rid of those guys, 
it'll stop the rest of the island looking like this and we can preserve 
what we've got in this Great Barrier Reef."* 
"By monitoring these little guys [Melomys burtoni, a native 
grassland rat], when dingoes are released, goats are removed and 
the vegetation comes back, we would expect little guys like this to 
start to increase their numbers...we're expecting that the removal of 
goats is gonna have far better benefit to these guys being a 
grassland rat than the little bit of dingo predation." * 
"The ultimate reason we are doing this is to save the flora and 
fauna on the island." * 
"The plan is: dingoes wipe out goats, we come back and humanely 
shoot those dingoes 'cause they'll have tracking collars, so we can 
find out where they go. If for whatever reason we can't come back 
and shoot those dingoes, …those little time bombs'll go off." * 
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“It then took 'em another 10 years to get rid of dingoes off that 
island and that became a great expense and a big problem and 
dingoes caused problems for shore birds and other things on the 
island. We don't want that to happen here. So, the...poison 
capsule...is a backup to prevent that from happening.”*  
"Releasing dingoes onto this island is basically an attempt to 
restore this island. And the dream for me will be to see the plants 
and all the animals come back as a result of getting rid of goats. 
And if it works well here, then why not do it in some other places, 
including places nearby which are a lot worse off than Pelorus."* 
RSPCA CEO "By sticking some wild dogs in a situation where those goats will 
be eaten, partly eaten and then left to die a horrible painful death is 
the wrong attitude for 2016." †  
"We have no problem with the control of feral animals, but we 
have to kill those feral animals in a humane way. We need to make 
sure that council uses sharp shooters or whatever other method, 
rather than this very cruel method." † 
"We felt there were significant animal welfare issues not just for 
the goats but for smaller, native animals on the island and the 
dingoes themselves.”‡ 
RSPCA spokesman "While we accept feral animals need to be controlled, we would 
like to see other avenues exhausted before resorting to this 
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‘solution’, which could inflict pain and suffering on both goats and 
dingoes alike." † 
Petition Commenter "This is a sick strategy with no thought for the suffering of the 
Dingo."^ 
"Its [sic] not remotely humane…, not only will be the goats be 
savaged to death the dogs reward then is also to die a slow and 
agonising death, disgraceful and disgusting show of humanity yet 
again."^ 
"When will humans stop killing innocent creatures, seeing as we 
are the ones that created the problem?!"e 
"its [sic] a great idea to introduce dingoes to assist with an 
ecosystem problem however killing them in such an inhumane way 






“I was shocked to learn of this cruel experiment but even more 
alarming is the lack of thought for the native animals on the 
island."‡  
"Pest control should always be carried out in the most humane way 
possible – not by death row dingoes."‡ 
"I do not take this action lightly but on the advice of experts from 
the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection it’s clear 
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that this misconceived program needs to stop before irrevocable 
harm is done to the island’s population of Beach stonecurlews."‡ 
"While the control of feral goats and other pests is a responsibility 
of all landholders, the methods employed should not pose a risk to 
threatened native wildlife species."‡ 
"I will not stand by while one of the main predators of this 
vulnerable bird is deliberately released into its habitat.”‡ 
Minister for Agriculture 
and Fisheries, 
Queensland 
"As soon as I heard the detail of the council’s plan I sought urgent 
advice on whether I could step in on the grounds that it is a cruel 
and inhumane solution."‡ 
"At the inaugural meeting of the Animal Welfare Advisory Board I 
asked members to consider whether such practices are in line with 
current community expectations on animal welfare...There has to 
be a more humane way to deal with a feral pest problem."‡ 
a. Program plan: Introduce 4 sterilized wild male dingoes with GPS collars to the island to 
predate on the goats (Schwartz 2016a; Cripps 2016). After 2 years, lethally shoot dingoes 
to prevent them from predating on other fauna. Each dingo would be implanted with 
lethal poison capsules that would dissolve and kill them after 2 years if shooting was 
unsuccessful (Schwartz 2016a; Cripps 2016). 










Table 2. A reason table for either supporting or rejecting the Pelorus Island Goat Control 
Programa constructed by extracting reasons from stakeholder statements in Table 1.b  
We should enact the Pelorus Island Goat 
Control Program because we should… 
We should not enact the Pelorus Island Goat 
Control Program because we should not… 
protect threatened ecosystems. devalue the individual lives of animals. 
repair the damage humans have caused.b behave in ways that cause irrevocable 
harms. 
fulfill our duties as custodians of the land. kill or cause suffering for the sake of 
conservation. 
protect a natural resource economy. implement experiments that have 
questionable origins, outcomes, or animal 
welfare impacts. 
eliminate non-native species (goats). endanger the native fauna. 
unknown (private reasons and motives not 
communicated to the general public) 
use animals as a way to achieve our vision 
for nature. 
aDescribed in Table 1 footnote. 
bThis table is not exhaustive.  
cStatement selected for further examination with the ethics-based tool of argument analysis. 
SSG and follow color-figure policies and procedures. We would prefer it if you would remove 
color entirely.   
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Figures and Legends 
 
Figure 1. A conceptual model of conservation decision-making that defines the integral 
components of the decision-making process and thus increases the transparency of the role of 
values, norms, and ethics in conservation planning and decision-making. Informed by cultural 
values, normative constructs are critical for interpreting available empirical information, for 
choosing which ethical theories to follow, and for initiating a call to action. In contrast, ethical 
theories (e.g., deontology, consequentialism) inform how we ought to act. Bold rectangle and 
arrows indicate the components of the decision-making process that are omitted when normative 
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constructs are overemphasized; knowledge interpretations can be equated with or misconstrued 
as modes of knowledge acquisition, which can obfuscate ethical theories and allow the decision-
making process to sacrifice rigorous scientific analysis and logical argument construction. 
Dashed lines indicate checkpoints that temporarily pause the decision-making flow to avoid this 
truncated pathway: 1, elucidates motivations and priorities of the decision-maker and identifies 
those that may benefit from the decision-making process; 2, recommends self-reflection by the 
decision-makers, identifies potential points of contention, and encourages stakeholder 
consideration and engagement; 3, ensures decisions are thoroughly developed, are not grounded 
on inappropriate assumptions or poor reasoning, and are informed by relevant science. 
 
Figure 2. Example from the case study of the Pelorus Island Goat Control Program (PIGCP) of 
how argument analysis deconstructs a primary argument into a series of nested arguments to 
analyze the argument for truth and valid logic. To fully assess the soundness of the primary 
argument, a premise from the first argument becomes the conclusion of the secondary argument, 
and a premise from the secondary argument becomes the conclusion of a tertiary argument. This 
example is the nested argument supporting the implementation of the PIGCP. 
 
